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Philosophy	because	I	can	and	could	not	help	it	...	
I	never	became	interested	in	philosophy	primordially	or	originally.	There	is	no	source	event	
or	transformation	that	I	can	recall	as	being	the	defining	moment.	Stating	‘It	began	here!’	
would	be	misleading…	I	am	not	even	certain	that	I	originally	attained	an	interest,	or	even	that	
I	still	am	interested	in	philosophy	as	a	privileged	object	of	investigation	and	investment	‐	an	
aim	in	itself.	
	 There	are,	however,	moments	and	situations	in	my	life	where	an	interest	in	
philosophy	has	appeared	or	is	necessarily	forced	upon	me;	these	are	times	when	philosophy	
appears	as	a	seemingly	unavoidable	and	essential	questioning	of	fundamentals,–	as	a	‘basic’	
need.	This	being	said,	it	can	be	annoying	as	well	as	cumbersome.	Philosophy	as	a	‘basic’	need	
makes	itself	felt	as	an	estrangement	that	has	always	already	taken	place.	It	takes	the	form	of	a	
“Schritt	zurück”	in	which	one	pulls	away	from,	problematizes	and	reconsiders	the	given,	
including	the	given	sense	of	community,	its	presuppositions	and	even	the	given	self.		
As	now,	where	I	find	myself	writing	this	at	a	seaside	hotel	and	consider	whether	I	would	
prefer	to	stroll	to	the	restaurant	and	chat	with	friends	rather	than	continue	taking	pains	to	
scrutinize	and	reflect.	Incidentally	a	well‐known	‘philosophical’	‘solution’	or	resort	since	
Hume.	Concurrently,	however,	I	sense	that	this	latter	choice	may	be	lacking	in	philosophical	
substance.	In	such	situations,	philosophy	becomes	equated	with	a	tendency	towards	seclusion	
–	even	with	being	secluded	from	myself.	
	 At	times,	the	tendency	to	philosophize	goes	too	far	and	may	even	become	
insurmountable,	or	result	in	a	doubt	too	great	to	master.	In	extremis	this	is	a	state	that	gives	
rise	to	not	only	an	experience	of	alienation,	but	also	to	feelings	of	isolation,	loneliness,	
insecurity	and	despair,	as	is	evident	when	Descartes	describes	how	he	finally	reaches	for	the	
bottom	without	reaching	rock	bottom	and	finds	himself	suspended	at	the	beginning	of	his	
second	meditation:	”The	Meditation	of	yesterday	has	filled	my	mind	with	so	many	doubts,	that	
it	is	no	longer	in	my	power	to	forget	them.	Nor	do	I	see,	meanwhile,	any	principle	on	which	
they	can	be	resolved;	and,	just	as	if	I	had	fallen	all	of	a	sudden	into	very	deep	water,	I	am	so	
greatly	disconcerted	as	to	be	unable	either	to	plant	my	feet	firmly	on	the	bottom	or	sustain	
myself	by	swimming	on	the	surface.”	Still,	the	experience	of	problematization	may	disappear	
again,	only	to	be	replaced	by	a	sigh	of	relief	that	it	(hopefully)	transpired	without	incident,	but	
also	leaving	an	uncertain	longing	for	what	it	could	have	been	or	might	have	led	to.		
	 So,	I	probably	never	became	“primordially	interested	in	philosophy”,	so	as	to	
retain	a	constant	and	unproblematic	thirst	for	knowledge,	concerning	philosophy	in	its	
entirety	or	even	its	parts.	Rather,	I	seem	to	have	become	‘originally’,	i.e.	unconditionally,	
incontrovertibly	and	repeatedly	fascinated	with	philosophy	as	an	activity,	into	which	I	am	
placed	in	the	here	and	now	of	things.	This	occurs	willingly	and	reluctantly,	again	and	again,	
only	for	the	motivation	to	loose	its	intensity,	and	then	to	force	itself	upon	me	again	and	again	
once	more.		
	 Overall,	I	do	not	find	myself	working	within	philosophy	as	an	established	field.	I	
experience	myself	as	being	simultaneously	within,	outside	and	then	within	once	more.	I	am	
constantly	on	the	edge	of	philosophy,	relating	to	it.	On	points	of	uncertainty,	I	am	challenged	
by	it	and	attempt	to	locate	an	opening,	as	if	having	to	step	across	a	boundary	or	threshold,	
which	I	sense	I	am	doomed	never	to	cross.	I	therefore	‘live’	in	a	phase	of	the	‘original’	
emergence	and	destruction	of	philosophy.	In	relating	to	philosophy,	I	therefore	constantly	
encounter	my	own	limits	and	insufficiency,	often	coupled	with	a	sensation	of	never	being	
finished,	of	never	arriving	at	one’s	destination.	
	 Being	asked	why	I	became	interested	in	philosophy	therefore	leaves	me	with	at	
least	two	answers:	firstly	because	I	can	and	have	been	able,	and	secondly	because	I	couldn’t	
help	myself.		
	 In	this	sense	the	first	answer	is	exceedingly	simple:	I	take	and	have	taken	an	
interest	to	philosophy	both	because	I	can	and	have	been	able	to.	If	you	cannot,	it	is	obviously	
not	possible.	I	seem	to	have	had	the	capacity	to	overcome	the	inherent	challenges	to	thinking	
philosophically.	Also,	what	I	have	done	apparently	rang	a	bell	with	others,	which	made	it	
meaningful	to	push	on.	Indeed,	this	was	in	no	way	or	manner	obvious,	a	choice	that	was	mine	
to	take,	or	even	a	course	of	events	that	I	was	in	command	of.	Apparently,	however,	I	was	
always	willing	to	live	with	philosophy	as	described	above.	As	a	friend’s	love	of	a	more	basic	of	
wisdom,	a	love	which	is	so	modest	and	generous	that	one	need	not	be	a	master	of	it,	or	own	
the	object	of	desire.	This	is	a	love,	which	has	a	price	and	has	a	slightly	grandiose	humility	
about	itself.	
	 Either	way,	this	ability	or	willingness	is	not	merely	a	matter	of	choice	or	intent	in	
any	traditional	sense	of	the	word.	It	also	contains	an	aspect	of	doubt:	Will	I	be	able,	will	it	
resonate,	and	will	I	be	willing	to	endure	the	ordeal	the	next	time?	The	next	time,	which	is	
always	already	in	the	process	of	coming	about	–	right	now!	Will	it	be	worth	it?	Will	I	be	able	to	
overcome	the	challenge?	In	so	many	words,	the	‘exceedingly	simple’	ability	or	art	of	
performing	philosophy	will	never	be	a	matter	of	course,	but	always	challenged	and	
challenging.	Although	it	continues	and	is	found	in	extension	of	that	which	came	before,	it	must	
also	begin	anew	every	single	time.		
	
Consequently,	the	other	answer	is,	in	and	of	itself,	also	rather	simple:	I	do	philosophy	because	
I	have	always	already	commenced	this	endeavour	and	because	I	am	constantly	being	guided	
into	it.	It	is	therefore	not	merely	a	matter	of	being	able,	but	also	a	matter	of	inevitability	–	of	
not	being	able	to	stop.	
	 Philosophy	considered	as	a	tendency	to	problematize	and	“go	behind”	the	basis	
for	common	sense	assumptions	is,	as	far	as	I	see,	an	extension	of	everyday	life,	since	this	
involves	a	tendency	to	problematize	itself	and	common	sense	(doxa).	It	is	therefore	an	
integral	aspect	of	‘usual’	life	that	it	is	in	itself	a	process	of	constant	learning;	that	one	is	
constantly	inclined	to	view	the	given	at	a	more	basic	level.	Philosophy	is	therefore	not	merely	
done	out	of	desire,	ability	or	intellectual	surplus,	but	out	of	need,	distress	and	necessity.	You	
do	it,	because	you	are	pushed	into	the	tendency	to	philosophize	‐	because	you	cannot	avoid	it.	
	
The	present	and	its	ethos	
In	philosophy	as	I	practice	it,	the	constant	and	rudimentary	tendency	to	problematize	the	
present	daily	life	takes	centre	stage	is	intensified	and	given	support.	When	navigating	
historical	and	social	practice,	we	seem	constantly	to	distance	ourselves	from	a	given,	
communal	normativity	which	has	been	passed	on	to	us	and	to	which	we	have	been	
committed.	We	therefore	seem	to	be	leaving	an	ethos	or	customary	practice	all	the	while	its	
normative	requirements	still	apply	as	the	dominant	conception	for	society.	
	 Currently,	we	are	committed	to	and	guided	by	the	auspices	of	freedom	to	such	a	
degree	that	we	are	obliged	to	constantly	promote	it.	It	seems	absolutely	necessary	to	be	able	
and	willing	to	overcome	what	confronts	us,	to	such	an	extent	that	we	may	relate	freely	and	
independently	to	it.	However,	it	may	well	be	that	we	do	not	ourselves	carry	the	responsibility	
for	the	limitations	that	surround	us	and	the	dependencies	that	we	face;	and	yet	we	ascribe	
each	other	responsibility	regarding	how	to	take	these	issues	upon	ourselves.	At	first	we	might	
not	be	at	the	centre	of	the	world	and	its	challenges,	but	this	does	not	mean	that	we	can	avoid	
the	responsibility	of	setting	ourselves	up	as	the	centre	of	our	own	lives.	
For	a	long	time,	such	a	commitment	has	become	increasingly	important.	Today	
we	are	therefore	confronted	with	the	call	and	the	challenge	that	Kant	formulated	200	years	
ago	in	What	is	Enlightenment.	Enlightenment	was	the	requirement	for	man	to	leave	behind	
the	apparently	easy	state	of	“tutelage”	and	“self‐incurred	immaturity”,	which	he	constantly	
brought	upon	himself	when,	due	to	“laziness”	and	“cowardice”,	he	submitted	himself	to	“alien	
guidance.”	Against	this,	Kant	proposed	the	motto	of	the	Enlightenment:	Sapere	Aude,	namely	
to	renounce	the	easy,	lazy	and	gutless	dependence	on	external	circumstance	and	instead	to	
courageously	seize	power	through	independent	reflexion.	Today	we	are	all	challenged	by	the	
call	to	move	beyond	this	and	instead	become	self‐reliant	by	daring	to	take	responsibility,	to	
relate	and	reflect	independently.	Freedom	‐	as	a	coming	of	age	‐	must	constantly	be	
established.	It	is	an	offer	you	cannot	refuse	and	a	huge	commitment.	Indeed,	our	greatest	fear	
is	not	being	able	to	will:	not	being	able	to	ensure	own	and	communal	willingness	to	overcome	
tutelage	and	challenges	‐	not	being	able	to	want	and	to	will	(freedom).	
Insofar	as	an	ethos	has	been	passed	down	to	us	and	still	constitutes	a	common	
frame	of	reference,	[…]	and	although	we	may	be	leaving	it	behind,	it	risks	being	given	the	
status	of	a	’idée	fixe’,	a	static	and	obsessive	idea,	that	repeats	itself,	no	matter	what	else	
happens.	In	this	case	it	becomes	a	continuous	lie,	since	it	reduces	the	differences	that	created	
it	‐	it	represses	what	might	have	otherwise	appeared.	In	ancient	Greece	one	had	to	fulfil	a	
normative	requirement	to	stand	out	and	be	noticed.	Today,	each	and	everyone	should	be	able	
to	want	and	to	will	this.	The	challenge	has	become	generalised	to	the	extent	that	even	social	
clients	must	develop	a	plan	for	future	activities,	even	deeply	depressive	psychiatric	patients	
must	exhibit	agency	by	actively	participating	in	treatment.	Even	the	homeless	must	be	
empowered	and	the	pupil	at	school	must	evaluate	own	learning.	One	must	be	competent	and	
able,	which	in	turn	requires	wanting	to	will;	and	where	one	borders	on	the	farthest	limits	of	
one’s	abilities,	it	becomes	utterly	important	to	will	(again).	
The	examination	of	a	contemporary	ethos	distinguishes	itself	from	a	sociological	
or	historical	analysis	in	any	traditional	sense	of	the	word.	The	aim	is	not	to	give	a	complete	
description	of	how	we	actually	relate	and	what	happens.	Describing	the	pretentions	of	an	age	
is	less	comprehensive	than	describing	reality.	The	aim	of	the	project	is	‘merely’	to	examine	the	
level	of	normativity	and	prescriptivism.	However,	one	hereby	examines	how	guidelines	are	
established.	Indeed,	these	are	guidelines	that	determine	how	we	view	ourselves	and	the	world	
we	inhabit	‐	how	we	come	to	influence	the	world	and	leave	traces	on	it.	In	this	sense	the	level	
of	ambition	is	higher	in	this	kind	of	investigation.	This	is	because	the	level	of	normativity	
determines	what	we	are	able	to	perceive,	conceive	and	implement	and	thereby	what	can	
become	real	and	attain	existence	in	a	wider	sense.	As	such,	the	level	of	normativity	takes	
precedence	over	the	factual;	it	is	more	important	than	the	real	and	more	essential	than	the	
being.	
This	approach	prolongs	and	renews	a	long	tradition	of	metaphysics	and	critique	
of	metaphysics.	The	issue	is	to	examine	the	conditions	for	the	world’s	appearance	and	
attaining	being.	Note	however	that	this	is	done	so	as	to	attain	a	distance	from	the	already	
given	limitations,	which	is	not	the	same	as	disregarding	them,	since	there	are	good	reasons	
for	their	being	in	effect.	
	
Philosophy	with	passion	
Such	thinking	opens	a	fissure	in	regard	to	posited	and	persistent	contemporary	totalities.	
Philosophy	therefore	attains	the	character	of	what	Theodor	W.	Adorno	from	the	Frankfurter	
School	would	call	‘mourning’.	Philosophy	mourns	the	loss	of	an	‘ideal’	totality	that	has	never	
been.	It	does	this	by	constantly	showing	its	insufficiency	by	questioning	it	in	various	ways.	
Hereby,	philosophy	repeatedly	re‐opens	wounds	from	past	ruptures.	All	the	while,	philosophy	
affirms	this	rupture	making	it	possible	to	think	the	–	as	of	yet	‐	unthinkable.	In	so	many	
words,	philosophy	creates	a	space	in	which	the	subjected,	the	minority	or	the	other	can	
appear.		
It	is	exactly	in	force	of	philosophy	focusing	upon	and	strengthening	an	already	
existing	deficiency	in	the	social,	as	well	as	an	ability	to	comprehend	what	appears	in	this	
fissure	between	given	categories	that	it	may	open	up	possibilities	and	thereby	cherish	a	hope.	
This	hope	implies	an	expectation	and	even	anticipation	of	something,	which	has	a	character	
that	is	still	unknown	to	us.	For	the	sensation	of	wonder	to	come	about,	one	must	be	acutely	
aware	of	one’s	own	ignorance	while	having	an	initial	spark	of	understanding	and	the	hope	to	
understand.	
Philosophy	is	therefore	also	an	exodus:	an	affirmation	of	leaving	the	world	as	you	
know	it	and	entering	one	you	do	not	yet	know.	Philosophy,	as	I	view	it,	partly	forces	me	into	
exile	all	the	while	this	exile	is	also	something	I	seek.	This	places	me	in	a	strange	limbo,	in	a	
temporary	state	of	parting,	since	I	am	forced	to	leave	my	homeland,	without	ever	completely	
cutting	all	ties.	An	uncertain	period	of	awaiting	a	decision	or	resolution	is	inflicted	upon	the	
pagans	and	philosophers	that	did	not	accept	Christ,	at	least	according	to	Dante.	This	limbo,	
however,	still	yields	the	promise	of	something	more	(Raffnsøe,	2009),	of	being	able	to	go	
somewhere	else	even	though	one	may	never	fully	arrive	in	a	new	and	promised	land.	
	 Insofar	as	philosophy	is	working	with,	and	the	workings	of,	an	existence	that	is	
already	problematic	and	even	problematizes	itself,	there	are	social	as	well	as	existential	
components	to	philosophical	thought.	Thinking	initiates	a	social,	historical	and	personal	
existence,	which	it	relates	to	and	seeks	to	transform.	For	this	very	reason,	philosophy	is	
endowed	with	an	existential	effort	that	reaches	beyond	the	merely	cognitive.	Philosophy,	
understood	as	an	amplification	of	daily	(self‐)problematization,	is	therefore		also	a	burden.	It	is	
connected	with	an	effort	and	maladjustment	of	thought,	wherefore	it	includes	an	askesis	for,	
limitation	of	and	restraint	for	existence.		
To	the	extent	that	philosophy	is	a	desire	or	even	a	lust,	this	lust	is	not	
immediately	given,	but	rather	mediate	and	conditional.	It	appears,	as	described	by	the	
German,	Enlightenment	philosopher	Immanuel	Kant,	in	connection	with	the	sublime.	When	
we	relate	to	and	reach	for	the	sublime,	our	desire	is	–	according	to	The	Critique	of	Judgment	–	
closely	related	to	and	alternates	with	pain	or	displeasure.	This	is	a	displeasurable	pleasure	
and	a	pleasurable	displeasure,	since	it	happens	in	circumstances	that	are	almost	too	great	to	
be	contained.	Perhaps	this	is	why	the	challenge	is	so	tantalizing,	but	also	dysphoric,	
oppressive	and	burdensome.	Even	when	existence	proves	able	to	conceive	and	retain	what	it	
seeks,	this	happens	in	spite.	It	is	as	if	displeasure	transforms	into	pleasure	by	my	being	able	to	
transcend	previous	limitations,	until	I	once	more	encounter	and	experience	my	limitations,	
and	is	prompted	to	reach	out	beyond	myself…	
	 Perhaps	powerful	emotions	such	as	sorrow,	hope,	happiness,	worry	and	ecstasy	
are	more	appropriate	in	describing	the	emotional	range	encountered	in	the	philosopher	when	
he	does	what	he	does.	Sorrow,	worry	and	anxiety	for	oneself	are	experienced	as	existence	
meets	its	limitations	and	is	sent	back	to	ponder	upon	itself	in	isolation.	It	may	then,	at	times,	
be	replaced	by	an	overwhelming	happiness	felt	when	transcending	the	boundaries	just	
experienced.	This	may	be	described	as	a	hope	and	enthusiasm,	which	borders	on	the	ecstatic.	
With	a	number	of	thinkers,	such	as	Nietzsche,	Heidegger	and	Foucault,	philosophy	is	related	
to	a	subdued	Verrücktheit,	an	ecstatic	release	and	forgetfulness	of	the	self.		In	return	this	has	a	
sorrowful	dimension	to	it,	insofar	as	the	self	is	torn	from	itself	and	turns	out	to	be	a	di‐vidual,	
an	ec‐static	existence,	which	contains	its	own	memento	and	thereby	melancholia.	Perhaps	the	
experience	of	such	a	self‐transcending	happiness,	ecstasy	and	liberating	melancholia	is	a	vital	
component	in	taking	up	the	challenge	of	performing	philosophy.	
For	all	these	reasons,	it	is	misleading	to	consider	philosophy	an	immediately	
useful	activity	that	contributes	to	and	improves	its	surroundings.	Philosophy	is	certainly	not	
an	absolute	or	unambiguous	value,	a	goal	that	must	be	pursued	on	its	own	conditions.	As	
Wittgenstein	and	Cavell	emphasize,	philosophy	is	something	that	must	be	taken	up	
judiciously	and	with	an	eye	on	when	to	begin	and	when	to	finish.	The	unfathomable	and	
insurmountable	task	of	thinking	his	way	beyond	metaphysics	cost	the	German	philosopher	
and	social‐diagnostician	Nietzsche	his	mind	in	the	latter	half	of	his	life.	This	included	
headaches	and	dizziness	until	he	finally	collapsed.	Although	Nietzsche	was	aware	of	the	
ambivalence	in	philosophy	‐	that	it	was	not	at	all	an	absolute	or	univocally	positive	activity	–	
he	was	not	able	to	moderate	his	thinking.	He	did	not	practice	sophrosyne:	healthy‐
mindedness	and	control	with	regard	to	philosophical	thought,	and	consequently,	had	to	incur	
the	costs.		
	
Subject‐areas	and	transcendence	
As	implied	above,	I	find	it	difficult	to	point	out	a	special	discipline	within	philosophy	which	I	
adhere	to	in	particular.	In	previous	publications	I	have	been	concerned	with	‘special	areas	of	
interest’.	These	include	philosophical	aesthetics	(Raffnsøe	1989,	1996/1998,	2009);	history	of	
philosophy	and	ideas	(Raffnsøe,	2002);	metaphysics	and	ontology,	philosophy	of	language	and	
philosophical	semantics	in	regard	to	the	humanities	and	their	status	(Raffnsøe,	Gudmand‐
Høyer,	Thaning	2008/2009/2010);	method	and	analytical	strategies	in	the	social	sciences,	but	
also	social	philosophy	and	the	philosophy	of	law (Raffnsøe	2002,	2002a);	medicine	and	
medical	history,	knowledge	and	knowledge	society (Johnsen	&	Raffnsøe,	2008).	I	have	given	
interpretative	introductions	to	various	philosophical	authorships	(Rendtorff,	Raffnsøe,	
Diderichsen	2003;	Raffnsøe	&	Gudmand‐Høyer	&	Thaning	2008/2009/	2010),	all	the	while	I	
have	studied	phenomena	such	as	rule	follwing	(Raffnsøe	2002;	Leth	&	Raffnsøe	2009)	and	the	
linguistic	turn	(Raffnsøe	2002);	experience	and	event,	trust	and	power	(Thygesen	&	Vallentin	
&	Raffnsøe	2008/2009);	welfare,	happiness	and	prosperity,	economy,	gift	economy	and	social	
exchange	(Thygesen,	Vallentin,	Raffnsøe	2008/2009).	At	the	present	I	am	concerned	with	
leadership	and	self‐management	(Raffnsøe	2010),	which	in	turn	involves	the	philosophy	and	
history	of	management	in	terms	of	social	contracts,	‐ties,	‐diagnostics	and	‐criticism.	
	 However,	it	is	difficult	to	ascribe	any	one	of	these	areas	of	research	a	privileged	
role	in	my	work.	I	am	not	able	to	view	these	subject‐areas	as	self‐contained	objects,	which	can	
be	taken	up	in	isolation.	Rather,	I	have	sought	to	articulate	and	reflect	upon	them,	by	
considering	them	in	a	wider	context	and	in	relation	to	each	other.	At	the	same	time,	I	have	
sought	to	trace	their	connections	with	other	areas	outside	philosophy	and	regular	spheres	of	
science.	My	most	important	contributions	therefore	consist	in	demonstrating	the	insufficiency	
of	treating	these	areas	as	delimited	and	isolated,	by	showing	how	they	upon	closer	inspection	
transcend	their	own	boundaries	and	point	towards	a	wider	context.	
	 In	this	way,	I	have	sought	to	open	the	previously	mentioned	fissure	in	regard	to	
given	totalities	of	our	time,	so	as	to	avoid	an	ever‐present	inclination	towards	totalitarianism,	
precisely	by	establishing	a	difference	in	what	is	taken	to	be	obvious	and	factual.	My	‘original’	
interest	in	philosophy	may	be	spurred	on,	not	through	a	univocally	constructive,	but	rather	
reconstructive	effort,	which	has	been	fuelled	by	pointing	out	the	possibility	of	transcending	as	
an	option	already	present	by	further	commemorating	and	reflecting	upon	it.		
		 Taking	this	into	account,	I	have	not	treated	any	subject‐area	as	a	limited	field	(of	
interest)	that	could	be	manoeuvred	so	as	to	possess,	cultivate	and	develop,	review	or	manage	
them.	Such	a	terminology	could	predispose	one	towards	a	certain	and	vile	territorial	
possessiveness	and	even	know‐it‐all	attitude	that	has	been	a	part	of	philosophy’s	self‐
affirmation	since	Kant	confirmed	and	argued	for	the	division	of	knowledge	into	various	
“Felder”,	fields	or	units	of	knowledge	and	validity,	which	one	took	into	possession	and	
asserted	sovereignty	of.	This	feudal	approach	to	philosophy	is	related	to	the	idea	of	
philosophy	as	an	only	seemingly	humble	aid	(to	society)	within	“my	specialist	field”,	even	
though	at	first	glance	these	may	seem	opposed.	Dissociating	myself	from	a	possessive	
approach,	I	have	sought	to	concern	myself	with	a	contradictory	constellation	of	opposing	
forces,	which	I	as	philosopher	was	inscribed	within	and	therefore	should	dedicate	myself	to	
experiencing	and	understanding.	By	experience	I	mean	an	event,	which	occurs	for	and	which	
happens	to	the	cognising	individual	(Raffnsøe,	2002).	As	I	understand	it,	experience	is	
therefore	not	merely	the	cognition	of	an	object,	but	also	a	self‐transformative	moment	for	the	
self.		
	 For	this	reason,	I	do	not	consider	my	contribution	to	the	subject‐areas	as	a	
univocal	mode	of	problem	solving.		I	relate	to	the	particular	field	so	as	to	insert	the	given	issue	
into	a	wider	and	more	comprehensive	context,	such	that	its	overly	obvious	character	is	shifted	
and	transformed.	This	kind	of	meditation	on	what	is	more	essential	in	and	to	an	apparently	
isolated	event	must	be	viewed	as	a	core	challenge	in	philosophy.	
From	my	first	book	on	aesthetics	(Raffnsøe,	1996/98)	over	my	doctoral	thesis	
(Raffnsøe,	2002)	and	until	today,	it	has	been	important	for	me	to	show	that	one	can	only	
properly	understand	what	is	at	risk	within	certain	disciplines	when	transcending	
specialisation.	It	has	been	necessary	to	examine	and	show	how	these	areas	are	constituted	as	
core	objects	that	confront	us	with	certain	problems	in	force	of	their	location	in	a	juncture.	On	
the	one	hand	they	are	constituted	through	an	extended	history,	all	the	while	we	are	already	in	
the	process	of	leaving	that	historical	commitment	behind	us,	such	that	it	no	longer	seems	so	
obvious,	but	rather	takes	on	the	format	of	a	problematical	history.	In	this	regard,	it	has	been	
important	for	me	to	show	that,	if	one	wants	to	understand	what	is	at	risk	within	the	field,	one	
cannot	merely	consider	what	happens	within	these	disciplines	as	an	answer	to	received	
problems,	but	rather	comprehend	it	as	a	contemporary	contribution	into	a	wider	social	
context,	which	it	wants	to	partake	in	altering	or	recreating.	This	is	all	done	to	think	through	
and	reconsider	these	fields	of	study	and	as	a	way	of	thinking	differently,	even	more	generally.	
	 Specialisation	and	isolation	of	certain	subject	areas,	often	associated	with	a	very	
specific	mode	of	scientific	thought,	can	constitute	a	sound	outset,	but	it	likewise	risks	
becoming	a	drawback,	which	must	be	overcome	in	order	to	think	philosophically.	If	this	is	not	
done,	it	is	no	longer	possible	for	philosophy	to	follow	Hegel’s	dictum	to	think	concretely	
rather	than	in	abstract	terms.	Should	that	be	the	case,	philosophy	risks	reinforcing	a	
contemporary	propensity	to	abstract	simplifications,	which	predisposes	to	prejudice	and	
rejection	of	the	Other.	Philosophy	will	remain	ignorant,	if	it	is	not	willing	to	understand	and	
reconcile	with	interaction,	by	exploring	its	place	and	role	within	a	wider	context	‐	by	
recognizing	and	accessing	its	limited	claim	to	truth.	
	
The	relevance	of	philosophy	‐	philosophy	and	other	sciences	
The	ability	to	remain	concrete	while	thinking	comprehensively	‐	rather	than	letting	the	matter	
remain	in	abstraction	and	isolation	–	is	a	hallmark	of	philosophy.	This	feature	may	concern	
life	as	such,	but	also	“other	sciences”.	However,	we	must	avoid	equating	philosophy	with	the	
widespread	misconception	that	it	should	live	up	to	the	requirements	in	the	modern	
conception	of	natural	science.	The	willingness	to	research	and	explore	are	more	important	to	
philosophy	than	the	requirement	to	stick	with	some	previously	defined	scientific	method	or	
conception	in	order	to	gain	legitimacy.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	an	essential	feature	of	my	
approach	to	thinking	that	it	inquires	into,	reflects	upon	and	problematizes	modes	of	
justification	at	a	fundamental	level,	as	these	apply	not	only	to	the	sciences,	but	also	
philosophical	and	societal	methodologies.	Exploring	modes	of	justification	has	been	a	
common	feature	of	my	work.	I	have	examined	which	modalities	(self‐)substantiation	may	take	
in	a	situation	where	the	traditional	approaches	to	legitimisation	are	no	longer	obvious	and	
often	even	appear	to	be	insufficient.	Philosophy	cannot	become	scientific	on	its	own	terms	
before	it	takes	up	a	problematizing	approach	to	its	own	justification	and	that	found	in	other	
forms	of	practice.	
	 Traditional	scientific	activities	that	concern	a	certain	subject,	in	abstraction	and	
in	its	own	right	as	isolated	from	its	surroundings,	risk	confirming	specialization	and	
parcelling	of	cognition,	only	to	become	overly	abstract	narrow‐minded	and	short	sighted.	This	
is	obviously	true	for	one	specific,	presently	canonised	mode	of	science	such	as	economy.		This	
highly	abstract	science	is	so	self‐evident	that	it	has	become	a	modern	metaphysics,	which	
does	not	know	its	own	limits,	but	rather	assumes	that	it	can	disclose	an	unmediated	reality,	
without	noticing	that	it	misses	something	and	what	that	something	could	be.	Philosophy	has	
an	important	task	in	regard	to	such	naturalized	sciences,	namely	to	penetrate	them	and	
articulate	the	constituent	assumptions	or	conditions	of	possibility	from	which	they	set	out	
and	spring	into	existence.		When	philosophy	points	out	an	area’s	limitations	and	gives	an	
indication	of	its	potential	for	self‐transcendence,	it	reaches	for	something	concrete,	namely	
the	particularism	inherent	in	that	science	that	at	one	and	the	same	time	gives	it	its	limitation,	
perspective	and	connectivity.	
	 Thinking	the	particular,	concrete	and	controversial	in	given	sciences	is	an	
important	challenge	and	opportunity	for	current	philosophy.	In	some	regards,	philosophy	has	
had	a	tendency	to	write	its	own	history	over	and	against	individual	sciences	as	an	on‐going	
history	of	loss.	Emphasis	has	been	upon	how	philosophy	has	played	a	lesser	role,	since	it	
constantly	lost	territory	through	the	birth	of	independent	sciences	and	areas	of	study.	What	is	
left	for	philosophy	is	allegedly	very	limited.	I	am,	however,	inclined	to	view	this	development	
from	the	opposite	perspective:	not	as	an	on‐going	loss,	but	as	a	continuous	growth	and	
addition.	Establishing	new	modes	of	cognition	is	a	challenge,	which	spurs	philosophical	
thought.	There	is	for	instance	a	contemporary	need	to	examine	the	philosophical	and	social	
conditions	for	economy,	so	as	to	rethink	this	science,	which	all	too	evidently,	influences	
society	without	its	basic	assumptions	ever	being	sincerely	questioned.	All	in	all,	the	
requirement	for	empirical	validation	in	scientific	cognition	and	social	praxis	often	confirms	
the	status	quo,	at	the	cost	of	what	could	have	been.	
	
Philosophy	as	a	praxis	and	historical	activity	
For	me	philosophy	diverges	from	‘normal	science’	in	force	of	not	identifying	with,	working	
from	or	contributing	to	a	given	or	closed	field.	Rather,	philosophy	is	a	kind	of	scientific	
practice	that	is	allied	with	and	committed	to	concrete	areas	of	knowledge	by	looking	into	their	
placement	and	basic	assumptions.	As	a	result,	philosophy	cannot	merely	perceive	science	as	
praxis,	but	must	view	it	as	a	response,	reflection	and	contribution	to	some	activity.	Philosophy	
as	I	practise	it,	is	concerned	with	theory	as	thinking	and	therefore	as	a	considered	practices.	It	
must	grasp	the	practice	of	theory	and	the	theory	of	practice.	This	may	seem	a	slight	shift	of	
approaches,	but	it	is	decisive,	because	it	changes	everything.	Cognition	is	therefore	not	the	
contemplation	(theoria)	of	circumstances	and	what	is	the	case.	It	is	rather	given	the	status	of	
practical	consideration.	This	is	how	I	understand	my	most	important	contributions	to	
philosophy	in	its	current	form.	It	has	been	important	to	retain	how	philosophy	speaks	to	its	
time	and	context,	but	it	has	likewise	been	important	to	indicate	how	this	has	had	implications	
for	its	own	being.	Philosophy	is	a	historical	activity	and	this	should	influence	the	role	it	takes	
and	how	it	expresses	itself.	It	is	characteristic	of	modern	continental	philosophy	that	it	not	
only	relates	to	time	and	history	as	external	conditions	for	its	ability	to	speak	the	truth,	but	
also	that	it	has	reflected	upon	time	and	history	as	its	own	internal	conditions	of	possibility	as	
well	as	upon	the	consequences	this	has	for	its	own	truth	telling.	From	Husserl	to	Heidegger,	
over	Derrida	and	Foucault,	philosophy	has	examined	and	reflected	upon	its	own	historical	
modality	or	historicity;	if	philosophy	is	to	play	a	central	role	in	its	time,	then	reflection	upon	
philosophy’s	own	time	and	temporality	and	their	implications	for	constitutive	conditions	of	
philosophy	is	still	an	important	challenge	to	take	up.	
	 For	these	reasons,	I	may	have	been	especially	provoked	by	and	interested	in	
fields	of	study	that	obviously	had	something	incomplete	or	non‐terminating	about	them.	At	
the	very	least,	I	have	sought	to	emphasise	and	reopen	their	incompleteness	or	non‐
terminating	features.	
	
Reconceptualising	the	social	ties	that	bind	us	
The	mentioned	approaches	and	outsets	are	already	emphatically	present	in	my	early	works	
on	aesthetics,	which	appeared	in	extension	of	my	degrees	in	philosophy	and	literary	science.	
Among	these	is	found	my	prize‐winning	dissertation	(Raffnsøe,	1989)	and	Filosofisk	Æstetik	
(Philosophical	Aesthetics,	1996	and	1998).	Through	these	studies	it	became	apparent	how	the	
concern	with	a	limited	field	of	study	was	taken	up	as	a	contribution	to	a	wider	social	and	
political	context.	Aesthetics	and	philosophical	aesthetics	first	become	autonomous	fields	in	an	
effort	to	retain	a	common	normative	denominator	as	a	starting	point	where	this	is	no	longer	
possible	as	such.	Rather,	it	must	be	taken	up	in	a	circumvention,	namely	via	the	aesthetical	
route.	Therefore	the	aesthetical	becomes	a	field	or	a	level	where	one	seeks	to	present	a	
common	social	commitment	in	the	form	of	a	continuous	search	for	that	very	social	
commitment.		
	 What	had	been	the	case	for	the	aesthetical	becomes	even	more	marked	in	the	
doctoral	thesis	Coexistence	without	Common	Sense	I‐III	(Raffnsøe,	2002).	Here	I	build	upon	
and	develop	a	number	of	established	sciences	and	fields	of	knowledge,	spanning	
jurisprudence	and	history	of	law,	history,	sociology,	political	and	social	science,	literature	and	
literary	science.	The	basic	aim	being	to	illuminate	an	overall	shift	in	the	nature	of	current	
social	ties.	Insofar	as	this	is	a	re‐writing	of	various	forms	of	science	perceived	as	contributions	
to	a	general	social	issue,	I	view	the	thesis	as	an	important	documentation	of	a	consistent	effort	
in	my	philosophy.	
	 The	shift	in	current	social	ties	suggests	that	we	are	no	longer	able	construe	
ourselves	as	belonging	to	some	overarching	unity,	as	was	the	case	when	we	were	searching	
for	agreement	on	certain	basic	values.	Instead,	we	seem	to	be	connected	by	various	unities	in	
a	variety	of	regards.	Different	threads	weave	the	social	fabric,	among	which	are	law	and	order,	
systems	of	discipline,	welfare	and	negotiation	etc.	These	each	appear	as	constructions	that	
can	be	taken	up	and	altered,	but	they	cannot	be	taken	up	all	at	once.	Such	a	social	fabric	unites	
us,	since	it	determines	how	we	relate,	but	also	how	we	relate	to	ourselves.	
	 The	aim	of	mapping	such	a	multitude	of	social	connections	is	not	to	remind	us	of	
a	commitment	to	them,	but	rather	to	articulate	them,	such	that	we	can	counteract	becoming	
their	unknowing	propagators.	This	makes	it	possible	to	reflect	upon	and	relate	to	what	
constantly	disposes	us	towards	certain	actions.	It	thus	becomes	possible	to	counteract	the	
overarching	danger	of	men,	in	Thoreau’s	words,	becoming:	“the	tools	of	their	tools”,	meaning	
that	man	becomes	a	tool	for	technologies	that	we	use	in	relating	to	each	other.	Here	we	risk	
dehumanising	man	in	making	him	subject	to	an	alien	logic,	thus	only	reaching	the	level	of	the	
less	than	human	or	subhuman.	Insofar	as	it	is	possible	to	reflect	upon	and	relate	
independently	to	such	logic,	man	may	recreate	himself	anew.				
	
Foucault	and	contemporary	diagnosis	
A	thoroughgoing	analysis	of	how	a	number	of	social	tools	or	(“dispositives”)	come	about	
through	our	interaction	and	comes	to	determine	how	we	relate	can	be	found	with	the	French	
philosopher	Foucault.	His	main	aim	with	such	an	analysis	and	approach	was	to	challenge	the	
all	too	determinate	character	of	such	dispositives.	In	fact,	this	determination	occurs	already	
before	we	are	aware	of	it:	Its	workings	happen	unnoticed.	Foucault’s	mode	of	analysis	and	
authorship	therefore	play	a	comprehensive	role	in	the	previously	mentioned	thesis.	
	 Along	with	my	co‐authors,	I	have	attempted	to	give	a	more	basic	insight	into	
Foucault’s	thought	by	writing	a	book	about	his	authorship	(Raffnsøe,	Gudmand‐Høyer,	
Thaning	2008/2009),	which	has	been	published	in	German	(Raffnsøe	et	al.	2010)	and	is	in	the	
process	of	being	prepared	for	publication	in	English.	In	extension	of	Nietzsche	and	Kant,	we	
seek	to	show	that	Foucault	attains	the	character	of	a	contemporary	diagnostician,	insofar	as	
he	seeks	to	determine	how	contemporary	tendencies	influence	us.	Since	such	engaged,	
situated	and	normative	thought	examines	the	yardsticks	in	the	making,	it	likewise	points	out	
other	yardsticks,	which	must	be	precluded	in	the	analysis.	The	work	is	therefore	given	the	
character	of	an	on‐going	articulation	of	a	previously	implicit	normativity.	
	 While	we	demonstrate	the	strengths	in	such	an	approach,	we	also	show	how	it	
raises	a	number	of	new	questions	and	issues.	Insofar	as	the	normativity	in	contemporary	
diagnosis	is	characterised	by	a	continuing	shift,	it	becomes	difficult	to	give	a	definite	point	in	
time	for	its	beginning	and	conclusion	from	which	one	can	speak	and	justify	one’s	analysis	and	
which	gives	clear	contours	of	the	analysis	and	its	precise	commitments	and	effects.		
	
Present	research	project	–	managing	self‐management	
The	nature	of	contemporary	social	ties	is	studied	in	a	four‐year	research	programme:	
Management	of	Self‐Management,	which	is	based	upon	6.4	million	kroner	(0.86	mio.	Euro)	
financing	from	Velux	Fonden.	In	collaboration	with	8	other	researchers	from	my	department,	I	
have	examined	how	modes	of	management,	theories	and	organisation	in	modern	work‐life	
build	upon,	assume	and	promote	employees	and	managerial	staff’s	ability	to	manage	
themselves.	At	the	same	time,	self‐management	and	developing	independence	has	become	a	
mainstream	social	contract	through	several	hundred	years	of	pre‐history:	the	previously	
mentioned	social	contract	is	developed	as	a	norm	for	both	social	and	personal	existence,	as	it	
occurs	in	the	social	encounters	that	extend	from	basic	schooling’s	teacher‐,	pupil‐,	parent‐
meetings	to	the	treatment	plans	that	are	included	in	rehabilitation	programmes	for	the	
mentally	ill.	However,	this	is	also	included	in	normal	careers,	when	one	signs	and	further	
develops	agreements	with	the	manager	as	a	norm	for	social	and	personal	existence.	Life	
hereby	tends	towards	an	endless	self‐examination,	in	which	Bildung	or	personal	character	
development	not	only	occurs	within	the	settings	of	educational	institutions,	but	has	been	
generalised	through	an	ever	present	transformation	process	of	reconstruction	as	we	strive	for	
perfection,	which	conditions	us	to	want	to	be	able	and	to	will.	
This	research	is	found	in	extension	of	previous	work	into	various	modes	of	social	
truth	and	cohesion.	All	the	while	the	previously	mentioned	issues	are	here	found	in	a	
heightened	or	at	least	intensified	form,	because	it	is	an	examination	of	how	freedom	as	a	
commitment	to	transcend	oneself	in	collaboration	with	others	can	be	a	strangely	
insubstantial,	but	also	highly	efficient	and	manageable	social	tie	(Raffnsøe,	2010).	How	to	
account	for	the	fact	that	Kant’s	and	the	Enlightenment’s	centuries	old	encouragement	to	leave	
the	“self‐imposed	tutelage”,	has	not	only	become	a	widely	accepted	challenge,	but	also	a	
common	obligation	that	binds	us	together?	How	is	such	a	seemingly	paradoxical	social	
connection	based	upon	the	connectivity	of	freedom	even	possible?	What	does	it	imply?	What	
consequences	does	it	have	for	the	individual	and	society	of	which	one	is	a	part?	In	addition	to	
managing	the	project,	I	am	personally	interested	in	examining	the	normative	guidelines	for	
how	every	individual’s	self‐management	is	connected	with	that	of	others’	‐	this	is	its	ethos.	
Here,	concepts	such	as	freedom,	welfare	and	perfectibility,	but	also	liberalism	and	the	
totalitarianism	of	freedom	play	an	important	role.	
With	such	new	social	ties,	the	humane	is	ascribed	a	position	of	hitherto	unknown	
importance	for	social	cohesion.	Humanity	–	a	mode	of	existence	that	in	Kierkegaard’s	word	is	
a	relation	that	“relates	to	itself”	and	which	can	first	become	itself	by	transcending	its	
immediate	form	‐	is	less	and	less	an	incomprehensible,	marginal	phenomenon,	as	it	becomes	a	
central	actor	in	the	social,	an	actor,	which	must	be	understood,	cared	for,	treated	and	
promoted.	
While	the	research	programme	is	coming	to	its	end,	the	implications	of	this	
transition	of	the	social	bond	is	being	studied	within	a	wider	context	in	a	new	three‐year	
research	programme	The	Human	Turn		that	started	in	2012.		Based	upon	5,57	million	kroner	
(0,75	mio	Euro)	financing	from	Velux	Fonden,	this	programme	involves	researchers	from	
major	Danish	Universities,	among	others	Professor	Kirsten	Hastrup	(University	of	
Copenhagen),	Professor	Anne‐Marie	Mai	(University	of	Southern	Denmark),	Professor	Uffe	
Juul	Jensen	and	Associate	Professor	Morten	Raffnsøe‐Møller	(both	Aarhus	University),	and	
Assistant	Professor	Marius	Gudmand‐Høyer	(Copenhagen	Business	School)	(Raffnsøe	2013).		
With	the	human	turn,	the	humane	also	takes	up	centre	stage	in	shape	of	the	
trans‐humane.	While	I	previously	noted	that	there	has	been	a	threat	of	the	humane	regressing	
to	the	sub‐humane,	the	humane	is	now	confronted	with	the	task	of	having	to	live	up	to	the	
trans‐humane:	having	to	live	on	the	edge	and	occasionally	pass	the	hitherto	known	optimum	
for	both	the	species	and	the	individual.	With	this	kind	of	trans‐humanism,	man	comes	into	
focus	as	that	which	no	longer	knows	itself	and	its	core,	but	which	must	re‐invent	himself	or	
herself	on	the	edge	of	that	very	same	self.	It	is	therefore	an	important	task	to	examine	and	to	
manage	this	(trans)‐humanity.		
We	are	in	a	society	where	the	greatest	defect	is,	in	the	words	of	Proust:	Ne	pas	
savoir,	ne	pas	pouvoir	”vouloir",	not	knowing	and	not	“wanting”.	And	the	metaphysics	of	will	
is,	according	to	the	German	ontologist	Heidegger,	the	final	implication	of	metaphysics…	
	 In	order	to	facilitate	such	a	critical	inquisition	into	the	current	social	situation,	I	
view	it	as	a	challenge	to	develop	new	kinds	of	critique	that	may	replace	the	out‐dated,	
external,	supercilious	and	lecturing	modes	of	analysis	(Raffnsøe	2011b).	This	could	be	a	
critique	that	took	its	outset	in	the	German	philosopher	and	literary	critic	Fr.	Schlegel’s	
indication	of	the	true	critic	not	being	a	judge,	but	an	“Author	in	der	zweiten	Potenz".	He	is	an	
author	to	the	second	power,	since	is	productive	and	seeks	to	contribute	in	re‐creating	and	
realising	the	substantial	in	the	work,	by	following	its	existing	trends	to	their	logical	
conclusion.	
Within	the	said	programme,	I	examine	how	the	humane	in	the	given	sense	of	the	
word	appears	not	only	in	management	theory	and	leadership	practice,	but	also	in	an	even	
wider	context	as	something	unavoidable	and	essential	over	the	last	centuries	(Lopdrup‐
Hjorth/Raffnsøe	2012).	Indeed,	this	is	true	for	a	number	of	sciences	at	other	faculties	that	
previously	did	not	have	the	humane	as	a	central	interest.		
In	extension	of	these	considerations,	the	programme	The	Human	Turn	examines	
the	implications	for	the	humanities	–	both	their	situation	and	character	in	a	wider	sense	–	
when	the	humane	takes	centre	stage	in	this	particular	manner.		The	sciences	that	investigate	
and	reflect	upon	the	human	and	on	humanity	thus	attain	a	new	relevance.	The	humanities	
may	attain	a	Pyrrhic	victory	in	the	process,	since	they	risk	increasingly	being	transformed	into	
human	resource	management,	all	the	while	their	strength	consists	in	being	so	much	more.	The	
human	sciences	can	for	instance	examine	which	challenges	occur,	when	the	creation	of	value	
depends	on	and	is	required	of	independent,	self‐realising	beings,	while	they	are	asked	to	do	
more	and	qualitatively	different	things	than	what	was	expected	of	them.	Likewise	the	human	
sciences	can	examine	what	human	existence	and	social	cohesion	is	in	the	process	of	becoming,	
when	man	is	constantly	posed	the	task	of	transcending	the	self	in	his	or	her	immediate	form,	
only	to	realize	him	or	herself	as	an	authentic	being	on	the	border	of	him	or	her	self.	
	 In	a	context	where	man	is	set	the	assignment	of	finding	the	self	by	relating	to	and	
transcending	the	self,	philosophy	may	have	a	special	role	to	fill.	This	is	because	the	inquiry	
into	man’s	place	in	the	world,	with	an	outset	in	non‐obvious	relations	to	the	self,	has	played	a	
decisive	role	since	Socrates	and	possibly	even	since	the	pre‐Socratic	philosophers.	Philosophy	
has	been	coupled	to	the	aim	of	giving	an	account	of	the	self	and	the	other,	and	for	oneself	in	
relation	to	others,	ever	since.	I	simply	cannot	appear	as	a	self	before	I	am	able	to	account	for	
my	Self	and	my	relationship	with	others	and	thereby	come	into	existence	as	a	responsible	
being.		
	
	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(1989):	Der	ønskes	en	filosofisk	diskussion	af	begrebet	om	det	autonome	
kunstværk	med	særligt	henblik	på	Heideggers	kunstfilosofi	og	Adornos	æstetiske	teori.	Århus.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(1990):	”Udlægning	af	den	idealistiske	æstetik”.	In	Philosophia	årgang	19,	nr.	
3‐4:	Århus,	pp.	91‐123.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(1992):	”Intet	sprog	er	en	ø…”	In	Erslev	Andersen,	Jørn;	Madsen,	Carsten;	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre:	Afskrift	–	om	og	af	Jacques	Derrida.	Forlaget	Modtryk:	Aarhus,	pp.	27‐45.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(1995):	”Det	danske	samfund	under	forandring”.	In	Kühn,	Gunver:	
Carlsbergfondet.	Årsskrift	1995.	Carlsbergfondet:	København,	pp.	16‐23.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(1996/1998):	Filosofisk	æstetik.	Museum	Tusculanums	Forlag:	København.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2001):	Moralens	evindelige	genkomst.	Gyldendal:	København.	German	
edition	2007.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2002):	Sameksistens	uden	common	sense.	Bind	I‐III.	Akademisk	Forlag:	
København.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2002a):	”Order	Ordealed.	Norms	And	Social	Coherence	In	The	Age	Of	Law”.	
In	Readings	in	Philosophy	And	Science	Studies,	Vol.	1,	27:	Roskilde.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2003):	Sameksistens	uden	common	sense.	Oplæg	til	forsvar	for	den	filosofiske	
doktorgrad.	Filosofi	og	videnskabsteori	på	Roskilde	Universitetscenter:	Roskilde.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2005):	”Æstetisk	overskridelse”.	In	Thyssen,	Ole:	Æstetisk	erfaring.	Forlaget	
Samfundslitteratur:	København,	pp.	71‐108.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2008):	”Qu‐est	qu’un	dispositif?”.		In	Symposium.	Volume	1.	pp.	44‐46.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2009):	”The	exile	of	art”.	In	Brems,	Bodil:	Exil.	Art	Centre	Silkeborg	Bad,	
Silkeborg,	pp.	46‐47).	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2009a):	“Prekær	velfærd”.	In	Sløk,	C.;	Villadsen,	K.:	Velfærdsledelse.	I	den	
selvstyrende	velfærdsstat.	Hans	Reitzels	Forlag:	København.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2010):	”The	Obligation	of	Self‐Management:	The	Social	Bonds	of	Freedom”.	
Villum		Foundation	&	Velux	Foundation.	Annual	Report:	København.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre;	Gudmand‐Høyer,	Marius;	Thaning,	Morten	(2008/2009):	Foucault.	
Samfundslitteratur:	København.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre;	Gudmand‐Høyer,	Marius;	Thaning,	Morten	(2011):	Foucault.	Wilhelm	Fink	
Verlag:	München.	Forthcoming	in	English.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2011a):	”The	Five	Obstructions:	Experiencing	the		
human	side	of	enterprise”.	Ephemera,	vol.	11(2),	www.ephemeraweb.org:	176‐88.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2011b):	“Kritikkens	kritiske	stilling	i	kritikkens	tidsalder”.	In	Kjældgaard,	
Lasse	Horne	(red.):	Kritik	200.	Gyldendal:	København:	38‐48.	
Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2013):	”A	New	Agenda	For	The	Humanities”.	Villum		Foundation	&	Velux	
Foundation.	Annual	Report:	København:	72‐77.	
Leth,	Jørgen;	Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2009):	”At	spænde	ben	for	det	perfekte”.	Turbulens:	
København,	pp.	79‐91.	
Leth,	Jørgen;	Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2011):	”Tripping	Up	the	Perfect”.	Ephemera,	vol.	11(2),	
www.ephemeraweb.org:	189‐203.	
Lopdrup‐Hjort,	Thomas;	Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2012):	“Udenfor	er	afgørende.	Værdiskabelsens	
nye	grundbetingelser	og	erhvervsøkonomiens	status”.	In	Raffnsøe‐Møller,	Morten	(red.):	
Kapitalismens	ansigter.	Philosophia:	Aarhus		
Rendtorff,	Jacob	D.;	Raffnsøe,	Sverre;	Diderichsen,	Adam	(2003):	Fransk	filosofi.	Politikens	
Forlag:	København.	
Thygesen,	Niels;	Vallentin,	Steen;	Raffnsøe,	Sverre	(2008/2009):	Tilliden	og	magten	–	om	at	
lede	og	skabe	værdi	gennem	tillid.	Børsens	Forlag,	København.	
